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Introduction: 
A Discussion on the
Global and Universal
THE EDITORS
In the fall of 2014, Grey Room was presented with a provocative
critique: an essay that found an unexpected epistemic affinity
between humanitarianism and global history writing. A few
months earlier, in June, the World Heritage Committee of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) had voted to place the Erbil Citadel on the World
Heritage List. But this designation (of an ancient mud-brick tell
at the heart of a living city in Iraqi Kurdistan) had a troubling
backstory. Eight years earlier, Kurdish authorities had cleared
the citadel of its inhabitants (many of them refugees) as a first
step in transforming “the longest continuously inhabited site
in the world” into a certified site of heritage. Did this case study
point to a more pervasive contemporary condition? Are global
history writing, humanitarianism, and the global heritage
industry mutually enforcing regimes? Have the architectural
monument, the quotidian shelter, and the individual refugee
become products of now distinct conceptual frameworks?
Daniel Bertrand Monk and Andrew Herscher are both experts
in the history of violence, architecture, and urban space. The
critique they put forward is as strident as it is controversial,
especially in its explicit and implicit dismissal of the authority
of academic disciplines—from history to anthropology, from
sociology to political science—to govern our understanding of
humanitarian crises. As editors we felt that this critique, which
Monk and Herscher identify as a negative dialectical view of
these seemingly unrelated forces, could prove a useful starting
point for a discussion across disciplines about the charged
terms and analytical frameworks deployed in humanistic dis-
course today. We generated a list of possible respondents from
across the range of fields most directly implicated in their 
critique. The initial provocation was circulated, responses were
solicited, and the results of the exchange are presented in this
issue, along with a summary response from the original provo-
cateurs. Centered on present-day concerns surrounding politics
and architecture (two of Grey Room’s organizing themes), this
debate’s startling juxtapositions also provide a probing instru-
ment for tackling the general question of universals and the
particular question of global history writing.
In the view of the editors, at stake in the discussion are the
meanings of a constellation of interrelated concepts—“human,”
“humanism,” and “humanitarian” and “refugee”; “shelter,”
“refuge,” “architecture”; “debt,” “credit,” “value”; and so on—
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each of which takes on profoundly different functions when
configured in starkly different syntaxes and in relation to dif-
fering bodies of evidence. Miriam Ticktin’s response takes up
this issue directly by questioning the historical horizons and
the moral valences of humanitarianism. Anooradha Iyer Siddiqi
is concerned to salvage the methodological and political effi-
cacy of microhistories from the implications of Herscher and
Monk’s recursive revisionism. Grey Room’s own Lucia Allais
addresses the fragmentation of architecture within a changing
“international order” as a specifically institutional project,
revealing the artificial limitations we so often impose on archi-
tecture as object and instrument of humanist inquiry. M. Ijlal
Muzaffar diagnoses Herscher and Monk’s deferral of any direct
articulation of a politics of humanitarianism and focuses on
their attention to a properly negative dialectic. But he then
invites them to a “second step” in the process of criticism that
would kick off a strategic collaboration toward constructing
such a politics. Lastly, Mark Jarzombek and Swati Chattopadhyay
each articulate (substantively different) methods for pressing
forward with a sufficiently “global” architectural history to
renovate a field that has been too passive in the face of an orga-
nizing geopolitics that has sunk beneath its own field of vision.
Finally, Herscher and Monk reply to these multivalent
responses. We see this not as a last word but as a renewed
provocation for further debate on the relations between, and
conflations of, disciplines and epistemes.
This last point is all the more important since, as the editors
of a journal that is deeply engaged with both history writing
and the theoretical legacy of poststructuralism, we recognize
the complexity of an all-too-often underemphasized and multi-
valent debate regarding the concepts of facticity, metaphor,
subject-medium-object relations, value, and indebtedness in a
diverse array of contemporary theoretical and historiographic
practices. How we historicize this period, and how many 
histories we put into play across disciplinary boundaries, has
the highest possible stakes for our understanding of the very 
conceptual and political crises to which Herscher and Monk
rightly call our attention.
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The New Universalism:
Refuges and Refugees
between Global History
and Voucher
Humanitarianism
DANIEL BERTRAND MONK AND ANDREW HERSCHER
In 2006, around 840 Iraqi refugee and internally displaced 
families were removed from the Erbil Citadel in Iraqi Kurdistan
in order to transform the walled town into a heritage site and
tourist destination.1 The United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) identified the citadel as
“the longest continuously inhabited site in the world” and
sponsored a project proposal for the site that included “a visitor-
friendly area complete with hotels, restaurants, museums and
galleries.”2 To enact this plan, the Kurdistan Regional Government
allocated each displaced family a 250-square-meter plot of land
ten kilometers outside of Erbil along with $4,000 as “self-help”
to build a house. “The city also prevailed upon one family to
accept compensation but stay in their citadel home to ensure
there [would be] . . . no break in the site’s continuous habita-
tion” and to maintain the water pumps necessary to mitigate
chronic erosion problems there.3 In June 2014, after several
years of restoration and reconstruction work undertaken by
UNESCO and the Kurdish government’s High Commission 
for Erbil Citadel Revitalization, UNESCO’s World Heritage
Committee voted to place the citadel on the World Heritage
List.4 In so doing, the committee inscribed Erbil within the
logic of a global history that has always privileged the fruits of
“trans-civilizational” encounters and sought to present these as
evidence of a tacit cosmopolitanism guiding human affairs.5 
That the citadel, which historically functioned as a place 
of refuge, could be institutionalized as historic architecture 
only by cleansing it of contemporary refugees—perhaps the
only contemporary interpretive community who regarded the
citadel in accordance with its actual status in the “slaughter-
bench” of history—is more than a simple irony.6 The removal
of refugees from the citadel was not only consistent with cur-
rent understandings of global history and humanitarianism
alike; it was in a certain sense made self-evidently necessary by
the current logic of each and begins to point to an unexamined
relation between them. Just as specific sites are now allocated
to a mode of existence reserved for global history—with its atten-
dant transformation into heritage and tourist destinations—so,
too, are refugees relegated to a strangely new administered
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sphere, one associated with bare life but also one in which
locations matter—or exist—only by virtue of their proximity to
infrastructures of voucher distribution and redemption, most
recently in the form of automated teller machines, mobile tele-
phones, point-of-sale machines, and credit card readers. The
$4,000 allocated to Iraqi refugee families in Erbil joins with
other recent innovations in humanitarianism, such as the debit
cards given to Syrian refugees to pay for subsistence needs and,
in some instances, housing.7 With these variants of “voucher
humanitarianism,” we witness a growing indistinction between
the refugee camp and the world itself. A world in which
refugees are simply given funds to house themselves (like 
the Section 8 residents who are the beneficiaries of the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development voucher ini-
tiatives) is a place that can become a refugee camp, anywhere
and everywhere . . . except in designated refuges like the Erbil
Qala’a. Confirming a rationality distinct from reason, the 
funds generated by heritage tourism are expected to join a
resource pool that will support, among the Kurdistan Regional
Government’s many other endeavors, humanitarian assistance
to non-Kurdish refugees displaced—in part—by heritage
tourism itself.
Erbil consequently invites a meditation on the contempo-
rary disaggregation of the refuge from the refugee—and not
only at the level of practice. The coeval emergence and self-
fashioning of global architectural history and voucher human-
itarianism as autonomous cognitive regimes points beyond
transformations in technocracy or the division of labor to sug-
gest a new, and tacitly normative, configuration of the univer-
sal that can be read only paratactically: in the discontinuous
continuity between a new ecumenism of place and the desig-
nated place of humanitarianism.
Humanitarian Architecture and Architectural Humanitarianism
This dissociation of refuge from refugee is remarkably new. In
the modern history of architecture and modern humanitarianism
alike, the continuity between these spheres was both registered
and reinforced in a shared preoccupation with shelter. In their
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most radical moments, each field sought its own self-abolition
in the fulfillment of the other. Whatever else it aspired to attain,
the architectural modernism of the interwar period also envi-
sioned itself as a humanitarian practice of sorts, of necessity
preoccupied with the unhoused and underhoused. Le
Corbusier’s Ville Contemporaine project (1922) was not simply
an art-historical achievement but the demographic artifact of a
war that resulted in the destruction of nearly 300,000 dwellings
in France and rendered approximately 750,000 French families
homeless.8 However modest by comparison, its realized cor -
relates—the “red belt” around Paris and the achievements of
Ernst May and Martin Wagner in Frankfurt and Berlin—corre-
spond with ugly facts of wartime capital destruction. In France,
Russia, and Germany real national wealth dropped 25–50 
percent, and so—in the minds of many—the socialization and
standardization of housing was required to contend with the
continental scale of Haussmannization effected by the conflict
itself.9 This imperative is even recorded in the charter of the
Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM), albeit
obliquely. The La Sarraz Declaration of 1928 sought to respond
to the related phenomena of capital losses and weak states by
developing universal standards of shelter. The resulting effi-
ciencies, it proclaimed, could “foster the maximum satisfaction
of the needs of the greatest number.”10 In effect, architectural
modernism was forced to contend with the results of a mass
war directed against mass subjects and so applied itself to the
question of mass housing. As it inexpertly experimented with
paradigms such as the “minimum dwelling” (Existenzminimum)
and the “new building” (neues Bauen), it expertly aimed at the
extinction of (what the declaration derided as) an academic
“Architecture” in order to fashion a technocracy capable of
offering universal standards of shelter. This project had a
reformist dimension: the preemption of revolution by the
deployment of a deacademicized architecture, as Le Corbusier
urged. And it also had a revolutionary aspect, according to
which “architecture” itself would be subordinated to “build-
ing,” as in the case of Hannes Meyer’s Bauhaus, or to “objects,”
as in the case of some Soviet constructivists. But in either of
these dimensions the humanitarian modernist project was not
only timely but prescient. With more than 50 million people
displaced after World War II, and a parallel history of decolo-
nization in the immediate postwar period, architecture’s
humanitarian imperative continued, even as its previous
notions of universal standards would themselves be ques-
tioned in the form of alternative modernisms, critical region-
alisms, and other attempts to assert the claims of locality in
tandem with the demands of “human security.”11
Read against the grain, the history of humanitarianism has
been, from the outset, a chronicle of the history of “the housing
question.” Precisely as initiatives developed to ameliorate the
suffering of victims of war—the events that led to the founding
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has
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often inaugurated histories of global humanitarianism—the
suffering of the working class in the industrializing cities 
of England was consistently theorized and imagined in terms of
shelter. From Friedrich Engels’s The Conditions of the Working
Class in England, through Charles Booth’s Life and Labour of
the People in London, to B. Seebohm Rowntree’s Poverty: A
Study of Town Life, the European working class was subjected
to proto-anthropologies already developed against colonized
peoples, with concerns over social hygiene, morality, public
health, and poverty manifested in investigations of housing
conditions and calls for housing reform.12 With the consolida-
tion and expansion of humanitarianism as an explicit political
project, especially after the Second World War, attention to the
plight of the working class through the slums they inhabited
developed into attention to the plight of the displaced through
the shelters they were provided. The mass displacements and
forced migrations of the twentieth century thereby transformed
the modern era into what Michel Agier calls a “century of
camps,” during which expertise in the provision of temporary
shelter and humanitarian government was increasingly forced
to contend with the permanence of the impermanent.13 In so
doing, the very categories by means of which humanitarianism
has come to identify and classify the recipients of its efforts—
“refugees,” “internally displaced people,” “asylum seekers,”
and so on—were based on spatial conditions and circum-
stances of homelessness. The turn from “relief” to “develop-
ment” in humanitarianism during the 1970s and 1980s only
intensified the field’s focus on housing, with proper forms of
residence posed as preventative measures against the threats
and dangers of disaster.14
Yet the more recent history of those conjoined practices—
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an architecture in abeyance and a humanitarianism in emer-
gence—is one in which these practices would be disconnected,
their disconnections made self-evident, and their relationship
then reestablished in supplementary and compensatory forms.
In architecture, these forms include the founding of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) specialized in postdisaster
relief and reconstruction, concentrations and degree programs
in architectural schools on “activism” and “social practice,”
the focusing of design-build and community design initiatives
on postconflict and postdisaster environments, and the emer-
gence of “pro bono” and “public” architecture as professional
subfields. In humanitarianism, these forms include the found-
ing of intergovernmental organizations and NGOs focused on
issues of shelter, the formulation of “minimum standards” and
“best practices” for postdisaster shelter and settlement, the
emergence of site planning and shelter provision as specialized
areas of postdisaster and postconflict expertise, and the framing
of global shelter as a problem for United Nations (UN)–spon-
sored institutions and initiatives such as UN-Habitat, the
World Urban Campaign, and the World Urban Forum.
More important: the disconnection of refuge from refugee
has been subsidized in emergent epistemes. The globalization
of the history of architecture has played its own role in the
dehumanitarianization of architectural construction. Following
the intellectual project of global history in general, it sought to
advance what William H. McNeill describes as an “ecumeni-
cal” approach premised upon “typologies” of civilizational
interaction.15 On its own terms, this globalization in architec-
tural history has displaced historical attention from the narrow
and exclusive confines of “the West”—confines that were intri-
cately tied to colonized and “non-Western” spaces—to pre-
sumably inclusive and heterogeneous arrays of “local” sites
across the globe. The “global history” of architecture has
thereby become a history through and across “localities”: a his-
tory of locations, of “local architecture,” of architecture “trian-
gulated by the exigencies of time and location.”16 At the same
time, such efforts to chasten the false or incomplete universals
of the high modernist humanitarian architectural project by
relativizing the “local” that it never took into account also 
constitute a species of reenchantment with the given world. In
these efforts, the local reveals itself to be little more than a vari-
ant or exemplar of a globally salient phenomenon. (And here
we see the first limnings of a new ecumenical notion of the uni-
versal that is anything but ecumenical or universal.) Whether
the objects of global histories of architecture are defined as—
just to take a few recent examples—“significant symbolic 
monuments,” “monumental architecture,” or the products of
historically and culturally specific divisions of labor between
“architects, builders, and clients,” the turn toward global archi-
tectural history has been conjoined with the recuperation of
architecture as that which is not reducible to “mere” refuge and
must be scrupulously distinguished from it. Here, global archi-
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tectural history reveals its sometimes disavowed intersection
with UNESCO world history and world heritage, with the effort
to escape Eurocentric, imperial, and/or culturally specific 
categories on methodological or theoretical levels accompany-
ing or even driving the reinstantiation of such categories on
descriptive or taxonomic levels.17 Scripted by global history,
“local architecture” actually ratifies a universal canon of elites,
and within this canon all manifestations, from settlement pat-
terns to skyscrapers, can be subsumed by the same visual and
textual techniques of representation—if not the same words,
not least of which is architecture itself. Thus, if attention to
“locality” has expanded the confines of an architectural history
previously focused on “the West,” it has simultaneously
blurred the universal claims to and of architecture posed by the
same refugee for whom a humanitarian high modernist archi-
tecture sought to provide refuge. Global histories demand
citadels without refugees.
Reciprocally, the globalization of humanitarianism has also
played its own role in the dearchitecturalization of its own
efforts. This globalization, premised on moving beyond the
war-ravaged spaces of Europe to spaces of disaster across 
the world, accompanied if not directed a series of shifts toward
a statist, developmental, modernizing form of humanitarian
expertise: from responding to the effects of disasters to dealing
with their putative causes; from providing relief after disasters
to providing development aid as protection from disasters;
from humanitarianism as nongovernmental “pastoral power”
to humanitarianism as a component of state foreign policy and
“empires of aid,” among many others.18 These shifts each con-
tributed to humanitarianism’s increased investment in hous-
ing, with the housing standards and standardized housing of
the camp furnishing ways to efficiently guide postdisaster and
postconflict assistance and disaster prevention. At the same
time, however, “locality” began to emerge as a synecdoche 
for the general critique of camp humanitarianism. On the 
one hand, the permanent impermanence of many camps—
exemplified by the self-built structures of tin, adobe, and stone
constructed within the tents provided to Palestinian refugees
by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in Lebanon—
transformed standardized refugee camps into singular settle-
ments.19 On the other hand, the ambition to acknowledge the
“agency” of aid recipients as coauthors or partners in disaster
prevention and postdisaster recovery transformed the provision
of standardized forms of shelter into locally based programs for
shelter “self-help.”20 The critique of locality has thereby led to
still-emergent forms of voucher humanitarianism in which the
spatial residence provided by the refugee camp is in the process
of being replaced by debit cards, credit cards, and “mobile
money” for housing allowances, and the camp’s spatial control
is in the process of being replaced by biocontrols such as retinal
scanning.21 In this information regime, the provision of archi-
tecture is considered unnecessary and inefficient and may well
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be becoming impossible. Thus, if attention to “locality” has
expanded the confines of a humanitarian project previously
focused on typified and universally applicable forms and prac-
tices of shelter, it has simultaneously blurred the universal
claims to and of shelter posed by the same refugee for whom an
architectural modernist humanitarianism sought to provide
refuge. Humanitarianism requires refugees without citadels. 
A New Universalism: Cosmopolitan “Right” and “Wrong”
In privileging the “local,” global history has denied modernism’s
visions of the universal and in so doing bequeathed to the pre-
sent the possibility of a world of refuges without refugees—an
architecture without humanitarianism. Conversely, the coeval
emergence of the biometrically singular homo economicus has
bequeathed to the present the possibility of refugees without
designated refuges, a voucher humanitarianism without archi-
tecture. In effect, architecture and humanitarian practice have
each embraced the “local” as a plenipotentiary of the particu-
lar and in so doing confirmed the status of the “local” as the
instance of something else. Here, a perverse notion of the uni-
versal presents itself to view in the eradication of another.
Because, while global history endows each historicized build-
ing with a status consistent with an expanded definition of
architecture, and while global humanitarianism endows each
assisted person with a status consistent with an imperiled pop-
ulation, buildings and people are being defined in ways more
or less suitable for inclusion within given paradigms of classi-
fication or action. Every thing acquires near-monadological 
status, in principle, even as it is all the more relentlessly assim-
ilated within given repertoires of action in practice. As spatial
hierarchies, exclusions, and center-periphery relationships 
Monk and Herscher | The New Universalism 77
collapse into global history and their human remainder are
absorbed into a status quo qua disaggregated refugee camp, an
enforced cosmopolitanism that conflates equality with fungi-
bility presents itself as if it were the inexorable march of the
World Spirit.
Posed as a triumph of the singular, this integration erases
any words we might possess to describe the actual state of
affairs. The more relentlessly a neglected architecture and suf-
fering peoples are given privileged status as individuals, the
more they are ruthlessly integrated within the course of a uni-
versal history in which they can attain no presence as anything
other than instances of the priority given to the principle of the
particular itself. In that integration, refuge and refugee pro-
gressively lose any status as anything other than the means 
to the end of that same integration. With this loss, refuges or
refugees will no longer be, and as they disappear so, too, will
any consciousness of the fact that the demand for a relation
between shelter and the displaced persists. By contrast, the
forms of existence that found no representation in prior knowl-
edge regimes will be—at least—preserved negatively through
that which could not be integrated into them.
Postscript
While this essay was being written, political violence in northern
and western Iraq displaced hundreds of thousands of Iraqis,
many of whom sought refuge in the seeming or relative safety
of Erbil. No refuge was on offer at the Erbil Citadel, where the
crisis instead manifested as a threat imperiling a “historic 
monument” nominated for UNESCO’s World Heritage List.22
Nevertheless, on August 8, 2014, Erbil’s governor, Nawzad
Hadi, estimated that almost half a million displaced people
were inhabiting the city. “According to Erbil’s tourism author-
ity, [these people] can be found anywhere in the city with room
for them, from hotels, public venues, churches and mosques,
to cultural centers and parks.”23 With their occupation of Erbil,
the displaced refused the disaggregation of refuge and refugee
advanced by contemporary knowledge regimes and offered a
rebuke to the new universalism. Demanding that refuges shel-
ter refugees, they gave truth to the lie of the trade-off we have
been describing in which a finance-based humanitarianism
characterized by efficiency, flexibility, and, perhaps most
important, seemingly global capacity has replaced the direct
provision of shelter.
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Humanitarianism’s
History of the Singular
MIRIAM TICKTIN
In “The New Universalism” Daniel Bertrand Monk and Andrew
Herscher bring together global history and global humanitari-
anism to argue the emergence of a new (perverse) universal 
singular—a monadological refugee and form of refuge that
threaten to efface both. By putting shelter and displacement
side by side, they insightfully point us to different global pat-
terns, such as the turn to the principle of the particular. Monk
and Herscher read these patterns against the grain, offering us—
almost in passing—a new history of humanitarianism.
The usual story attributes the start of contemporary human-
itarianism to Henry Dunant in 1863 and his attempt to civilize
warfare by providing aid on the battlefield. This resulted in the
creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
in 1863 and the Geneva Conventions in 1949, commonly known
as the laws of war. Humanitarianism later expanded to include
not just zones of conflict but responses to natural disasters.
Monk and Herscher, however, tell us that humanitarianism was
from the outset about shelter and that we cannot understand
humanitarianism without taking seriously the spatial condi-
tions of homelessness. This provocative idea—while immensely
compelling—raises several questions.
I want to suggest that humanitarianism is not actually what
Monk and Herscher, despite their innovative approach, claim
it to be. I say this not to undermine their argument but to show
how it could be made more powerful by moving beyond nos-
talgia for a particular humanitarian moment. I will propose
three arguments to complicate Monk and Herscher’s account.
First, humanitarianism is not the same as modernist forms of
care such as the welfare state. Humanitarianism responds in
many ways to the loss of modernist ideals and politics. Second,
as just one illustration of its difference from forms of modernist
care, humanitarianism’s investment in the category of human-
ity has always been grounded in the protection of exceptional,
suffering individuals, not in care for the masses. Third, while
the more recent turn to voucher humanitarianism draws on
neoliberal technologies, it does not create but simply continues
an extant focus on individuals. Understood in this context, 
this new kind of humanitarianism may nevertheless offer less-
patronizing and less-violent ways of governing.
Let me turn to the first point. Even if we agree with Monk
and Herscher’s important argument that humanitarianism is
always also preoccupied by the question of shelter, we must
ask if all forms of care for or aid to the suffering or neglected
should be considered “humanitarian.” The kinds of action
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Monk and Herscher refer to—particularly those that addressed
the suffering of the working class in industrializing English
cities and those that attended to the working class by focusing
on questions of slums—might be better described as part of the
larger “government of the social.”1 That is, these forms of care
that resulted in mass housing (and architectural modernism)
were part of the invention of the social through techniques
such as social hygiene, public health, and moral reform. They
targeted, governed, and cultivated masses and turned them
into a national population in an attempt to counter the self-
interest of the modern, economic subject while leaving the eco-
nomic system intact. Government of the social worked to keep
the nation together, as “society,” while simultaneously enabling
economic practices that worked to pit people against one
another.2 Novel technical practices of care managed the newly
identified “social” needs of the population by marking each
problem as discrete—health or the regulation of housing—and
addressing them administratively, each with its own set of
experts: psychologists, social workers, public health workers,
architects, teachers, and so on.
While humanitarianism is descended from government of
the social, it is not identical to it. That is, humanitarianism
enacts its own form of government, drawing on the techniques
developed through government of the social, including a cen-
tral role for moral sentiment, while simultaneously rejecting
the idea of bureaucratized charity. The “new humanitarianism”
of the 1970s (developed by Médecins Sans Frontières [MSF]/
Doctors Without Borders and now the dominant approach to
humanitarianism in the contemporary world) looked instead 
to emotive responses, not rational or institutionalized ones.3
While care is central to this form of government, these forms of
care produce and protect not society (or the social) but a con-
cept of universal “humanity.” They often fill in gaps in social
services in the absence of a state or governing body, but they do
this only in the context of emergency and only for those
excluded from state care. That is, they can provide care only in
very limited situations. Their care is of the temporal present—
beyond that, no promises are made, no long-term human con-
dition supported. Similarly, they do not purport to provide
long-term housing. While humanitarianism has morphed in the
last decade, it is nevertheless still distinguished (especially
from other forms of doing good, such as development or human
rights) by its particular focus on crisis and emergency.
Humanitarianism has no long-term plan to address inequality.
Herscher and Monk understandably mourn a form of collec-
tive care, one wherein shelter was built for the masses, and
they mourn this as a loss of a particular humanitarian moment.
While a shift away from care and shelter for the masses has
undoubtedly occurred, this loss coincided with the decline of
the welfare state in the Global North and the decreasing impor-
tance of technologies of the social. The rise of humanitarianism
already marked that moment of loss.
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Second, while humanitarianism is fundamentally about the
category of humanity, it is characterized by a tension between
a focus on the exceptional individual and a collective humanity.
Humanity is accessed and treated through individual, suffer-
ing bodies, even as it is also figured or imagined en masse, par-
ticularly in the Global South.4 Humanitarianism is practiced on
humanity conceived of as a set of singular individuals facing
exceptional circumstances. So, when Monk and Herscher sug-
gest that a shift from a concern with the masses to a triumph of
the singular has occurred—a shift in humanitarianism as much
as architecture—I wonder whether this is actually something
new. We need only think of the classic humanitarian subject:
the refugee. As Hannah Arendt wrote in 1951 in her classic
chapter on “The Decline of the Nation State and the End of the
Rights of Man,” asylum as a category was always only meant for
the exceptional cases, never for the masses. As she states, “the
trouble arose when it appeared that the new categories of per-
secuted were far too numerous to be handled by an unofficial
practice destined for exceptional cases.”5 Refugee laws stipu-
late that those who claim asylum must demonstrate both that
their persecution is due to their membership in a particular
social group and that their case is exceptional.
In thinking about the emotions that inform and undergird
humanitarianism—the two most important arguably being
compassion and pity—sociologist Luc Boltanski also draws on
Arendt to argue that compassion is directed toward particular
individuals, particular suffering beings, without seeking to
develop the capacity for generalization. Compassion is actual-
ized only when those who do not suffer come face to face with
those who do.6 In parsing these emotional logics, Boltanski also
points out that the subjects of humanitarianism are at once
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hypersingularized through an accumulation of the details of
suffering and, at the same time, underqualified: one particular
child elicits our compassion, yet she or he could very well be
any other child. While singular, these cases are also at once
exemplary.7 This is precisely the logic on which MSF is
grounded: after the failure of May 1968 to transform the social
and political order and after the disappointment of anticolonial
revolutionary Marxist movements, the cofounders of MSF,
including Bernard Kouchner, and many of their comrades from
1968, radically changed their views. They turned away from
engagement with what they thought of as anti-imperial, anti-
capitalist politics and instead embraced the belief that one
could ultimately address only individual suffering. They
attended to what they conceived of as a universal humanity
composed of individual suffering victims.8 If the turn to the
monadic singular is taking on new forms, we should neverthe-
less see this as part of a longer continuum of humanitarian
principles and practices, one where the focus on the (often
exceptional) individual has a long history.
Finally, Monk and Herscher speak of “voucher humanitari-
anism” as part of this turn to the monadic singular. Voucher
humanitarianism undoubtedly represents a shift toward 
technologies of neoliberalism. Yet as noted, humanitarianism
already focuses on the individual—the monad. This being the
case, we might see the turn to the technologies of neoliberalism
(such as cash transfers to the poor) as opening up a politics that
is less patronizing, less about surveillance and control. As
anthropologist James Ferguson notes, the technologies and tac-
tics of neoliberalism can be separated from neoliberal political
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projects and right-wing ideologies.9 In the case of refugees, our
only option is to turn to the specific context of each instance of
voucher humanitarianism to determine whether it should be
seen as part of a conservative neoliberal political future or as
one that offers more dignity to the refugees. That is, does it
enable them to participate in larger polities instead of being
imprisoned in camps? Does it give them the means to obtain
what they themselves deem absolutely necessary, instead of
having to rely on standardized humanitarian kits developed 
in foreign locales? Refugee camps can be places of extreme 
violence, hierarchy, and dehumanization, so we need to think
carefully about when and under what conditions we want to
preserve their architecture.
Humanitarianism has always been saddled with the problem
of the singular. If we want to follow the powerful and thought-
provoking critique of neoliberalism that Monk and Herscher
are offering by reading global history alongside global human-
itarianism, we should look well beyond humanitarianism and
not try to recuperate its earlier days.
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In Favor of 
Seeing Specific Histories
ANOORADHA IYER SIDDIQI
Daniel Bertrand Monk and Andrew Herscher’s provocative
meditation on “a growing indistinction between the refugee
camp and the world itself” builds on a compelling narrative 
of contemporary Erbil. By commingling forms not typically
seen together—the humanitarian voucher and the world her-
itage monument—they bring into view the problematic links
between global economies and global histories and level an
important critique of a technique perfected by both, of invok-
ing the particular. My historical studies of architecture and
humanitarianism support this imbrication of refuge and refugee,
and I share the authors’ distrust of monadological construc-
tions of each.1 However, I believe that the narrative of Erbil 
in this prompt, while relying on a particular set of events,
eschews historical specificity. This element of abstraction in
the essay elides several forms of politics and thus limits its own
critical scope, with consequences for historiography. In rela-
tion to seeing specific histories instead, this response addresses
two sets of stakes—the first regarding discursive regimes and
the production of subalterns, and the second on methods of
global history.
First, the abstraction of refuge and refugee is central to Monk
and Herscher’s argument, one that is nominally tethered to
selected narratives of architectural modernism and modern
humanitarianism cited by the authors. Yet these very narratives
stem from specific histories that have produced specific shel-
ters, monuments, refugees, and humanitarians. By disengaging
historical particulars in favor of a dialectical abstraction, Monk
and Herscher’s text risks falling directly into the assimilative
universalist modality it seeks to critique, one “scripted by
global history . . . [that] actually ratifies a universal canon of
elites.” To hear the actual voices of displaced actors arguing 
for shelter rather than vouchers within an aesthetically rich 
narrative of families doubly displaced may instead perform an
important and complex historiographic task, recuperating 
an ethnic, regional, or geopolitical history as an architectural
one and, conversely, bringing architecture into urgent dialogue
with a historical politics. Moreover, a specific history of archi-
tecture and humanitarianism may serve in this instance as a
point of access for the historically marginalized into a discursive
realm of theory, just as its denial may produce an obstruction.
Because the question of whom we hear and see in our histories
raises concerns about who gains access to discourse, interro-
gating what it means for a text to use histories of architecture
and humanitarianism as foils becomes important. Much may
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be gained from their specific historical and material registers.
The majority of refugee sites in the world today are far more
unseen than those the text recalls. While recognizing the
authors’ important critique of a universalism ultimately based
in systems of global finance, we must also understand as sig-
nificant and distinct the geopolitically strategic value of the
region they reference, which includes Iraqi Kurdistan and
Syria. This has resulted in the extreme visibility of humanitar-
ian engagements in these locations as opposed to, for example,
at most sites in sub-Saharan Africa, where the architecturally
invisible strategy of voucher humanitarianism has been less
attractive and where governmental and nongovernmental
actors alike strive to make refugee populations visible, if often
for contradictory purposes: for instance, to make it possible to
attend to public health or to control migration, or for the shared
objective of attracting attention and funding from external
donors.2 In such locations, the production of humanitarian space
has encouraged the coproduction of vivid images of refuge (see
frontispiece), with contours etched distinctly between the camp
and the world. Moreover, architecture has conferred legitimacy
and authority spectacularly, approaching monumentality through
forms that differ enormously from the Erbil Citadel—massive
camp settlements, permanent humanitarian compounds, and
global infrastructures. These forms may be analyzed in the
same terms as those of the contemporary heritage monument.
Like the citadel, they signal aura and global value within the
same networks of finance capital, albeit by means of radically
different aesthetics and photogenics. At these sites, we see a
determination specifically not to disaggregate refuge from
refugee. As such, the Erbil that Monk and Herscher describe—
which demands the particularity of a refugee site that has been
intensely seen, staged, and imaged by and for the international
publics behind voucher humanitarianism, as well as a citadel
similarly cast for the publics producing and consuming world
heritage—cannot quite support claims to its universalism. 
If a historiographic commitment to architecture and human-
itarianism was not the authors’ purpose, such a commitment
might nonetheless have dispelled one of the essay’s primary
claims: that refuge and refugee have been universally disaggre-
gated. Furthermore, we ought to treat contemporary entangle-
ments of the two with suspicion. Through its at least partial
denial of specific architectural and humanitarian histories,
Monk and Herscher’s argument goes beyond reproducing forms
of political and social marginalization and engages in the pro-
duction of new subalterns in the realm of discourse. 
To clarify, while the text seems to acknowledge that each
emergency raises specific historical and political complexities,
it seems to treat architecture and its attendant imaging as uni-
versal. This flattening of the politics of specific architectures
and images stems in part from the claim that the “dissociation
of refuge from refugee is remarkably new.” This claim is not
entirely accurate and, more to the point, exposes a modernist
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lament haunting the essay.3 Shelter and encampment have long
responded to the deeply patriarchal desires of architectural
modernists and modern humanitarians alike, joining refuge
and refugee in enacting a space of welfare. This condition,
however inextricable from modernity, may be understood as
profoundly undesirable when viewing actual site-specific prac-
tices in a historical purview not limited to that described in
Monk and Herscher’s text. For example, we might look to 
a conundrum in modern humanitarian practice: the deeply 
gendered politics of the architecture of shelter and camp. If
emergency spaces must be rendered highly visible to humani-
tarian publics to attract donors (through increasingly sophisti-
cated mechanisms of image-making and circulation) and
funding is often sought using representations of a shelter or
camp, such representations rarely address the problem that its
actual architectures produce materially identifiable targets for
violence—targets who happen more often than not to be women.4
This problem central to the architecture of humanitarianism is
a long-standing paradox that has strangely privileged refuges
over refugees. To use architecture and humanitarianism with-
out engaging these problems seems not only to elide a social
politics and realpolitik but an urgency in the realms of theory
and historiography. Arguably, this politics of scholarship may
be recovered in the specific histories of humanitarianism and
architecture.
A second set of stakes concerns locating the borders between
global history, regional history, and microhistory—taking into
account the contemporary academic privileging of the first and
the disciplinary desires for an architectural canon to reflect it.
The specific history threatens not to subscribe to a universalist
historical regime, operating in the diminished scale of the local
history or the microhistory. Yet specific histories reflect (and
produce) unexpected channels for political actions and negoti-
ation. For example, ethnographer Sarah Keeler (referenced by
the authors) elsewhere examines the capacity of the interna-
tional regime in Iraqi Kurdistan to self-reproduce through
“managing or overcoming, rather than incorporating, local
views.”5 Voucher strategies (and any attendant denial of refuge)
are indeed elements that might constitute such structural
adjustment through the system of international aid. We may
imagine that a family worked willingly with the government,
electing a payment scheme instead of a cramped plot within
the Erbil fortress walls, however pressured to do so within the
spectrum of financial possibility. We may also surmise that
Hadida Hamademin Kader readily negotiated the option of
inhabiting the citadel with her seven children “to ensure there
is no break in the site’s continuous habitation,” even if it were
to lead to a form of submission implied in the scene in the
report cited by Monk and Herscher, of her “pouring strong,
sweet tea for visitors.”6 Similarly, we may understand history
differently through locally retrieved evidence—for example,
the plan on the next page depicting formal spatial practices
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behind a camp opened in response to the overflow of refugees
depicted in this essay’s frontispiece.
If we do not engage the complexity of such interpretations,
and instead dismiss their local or microhistorical scale, or deny
an understanding of events on the ground as transactional, we
risk a history that reproduces political asymmetries. Such an
architectural history can never be global, as its only political
commitment is to its own aesthetics. If a critique of global his-
tory resists the co-optation of the local by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
it ought also to implicate actors such as Kader, not to mention
“840 families . . . offered a plot of land outside the city, with
electricity, sewage and water and $4,000 toward building a new
home,” along with the semiautonomous Kurdish state itself.7
Together these actors enabled the reproduction of international
authority through aid and heritage in Erbil. However asymmet-
rical the relationships behind this voucher humanitarianism, if
we are to redress the universalism of global history, our call to
order must acknowledge (and name and give voice to) not only
the UNESCOs but the Kaders and other aid recipients who have
together coconstructed our architectural histories.
Through these two sets of stakes—on the one hand, processes
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of historical marginalization and, on the other, scales of his-
toricity—I argue for seeing specific histories. Indeed, rather
than refusing the World Heritage site, we ought to complicate
it by recognizing its position as a nuanced point of geopolitical
control for actors with little other power and by collocating it
with those less “architectural” settlements that we may deduce
to have suddenly appeared outside of Erbil as the result of 
a voucher scheme. Specific voices and ground engagements
enable greater historiographic complexity. The inclusion of
these may produce parallel data points to undergird a global
history that more properly resolves the authors’ criticisms of
the mobilization of the particular.
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This Criterion Should
Preferably Be Used 
in Conjunction with 
Other Criteria
LUCIA ALLAIS
Whether the goals of humanism and humanitarianism are fun-
damentally incompatible has been a recurring question in the
international political debates surrounding war and disaster
relief in the twentieth century. This disjuncture has often been
expressed in architectural terms as a distinction between
“buildings and people” or between “monuments” and other
kinds of architecture—the same distinction Daniel Bertrand
Monk and Andrew Herscher leverage in their dual provocation
against global history and voucher humanitarianism.
On the one hand, we have humanists who see architecture
as an object in the study of human culture; on the other hand,
we have humanitarians who define architecture as the shelter
of human life. I want to contribute to this discussion in two
ways. First, I want to ask, how did these two aspects of archi-
tecture become bifurcated in the international order? Second,
I want to follow one way this split is maintained today through
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), an agency whose role in global archi-
tectural production is undertheorized by humanists and
humanitarians alike.
1.
Monk and Herscher construct a symmetrical argument that
spans the long twentieth century to arrive at the present day,
where they detect, in a number of formal and financial 
complementarities, the return of a repressed “discontinuous
continuity” between empty monuments and displaced peo-
ples. Theirs is a powerful rewriting of the history of housing (as
a history of dehousing) and a compelling reminder that the
dominant mode of architectural permanence today is one that
“preserves negatively.”
However, in explaining how “the human” was bifurcated
into two realms of international architectural politics, this
symmetry and the historical narrative of “coeval emergence”
warrant a few important complications. Insofar as international
obligations were, like architectural solutions, created reac-
tively during a century of mass killings and mass displace-
ments, they not only arose gradually in response to a mounting
“humanitarian imperative” but were constructed willfully and
through sharply punctual geopolitical turns. Whatever else the
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second postwar era shares with the first, it differed fundamen-
tally in what Mark Mazower calls “the strange triumph of
human rights”: the fact that it was individual rights that became
the primary value celebrated by the United Nations in the
1940s, despite (or, Mazower argues, because of) mounting evi-
dence that it was the rights of groups, including internal
minorities, colonized peoples, and displaced masses, that
would increasingly need to be protected.1 This matters for two
reasons. First, because it explains why the refugees who settled
in Erbil had no obvious international instrument to which they
could resort in appealing their mass-expulsion. Second, because
while human rights in the second postwar period veered sharply
toward the individual, heritage law at the same moment became
decidedly collective through the concept of “cultural property,”
which has fixed heritage in space.2
In spatial terms, the “disaggregation of refuge from refugee”
originates at least in part in two different regimes of interna-
tional law: one that guarantees freedom of movement and the
other that abides by a logic of location.3 Seen from this per-
spective, fixity was long ago assigned to the monument and
mobility to the dweller through far-reaching legal code.
The Genocide Convention is an instructive exception to this
generalization; it protects group rights and was signed into law
in 1948 almost single-handedly through the advocacy of
Raphael Lemkin, who thought of it as a counterproject to the
contemporaneous Human Rights Declaration.4 Lemkin took the
concept of “culture” as a protective category and even argued
in 1933 that any group protection would have to pertain not
only to acts of “barbarism” against people but also acts of “van-
dalism” against their art and architecture. Surprisingly, his
notion of culture as that which sustains collective existence
did not preclude another notion of art and architecture “as
property and as the culture of the collectivity.”5
But this proposed conflation, which could have been the
crux of a spatial form of cultural and dwelling protection, was
not to be. As the 1930s wore on, the movement for “the human-
ization of war” struggled to bind together a proposed military
exception against bombing cultural sites and another against
bombing civilians. By the time the 1954 Hague Convention was
signed, nation-states agreed to protect architecture as an inter-
national value only after making a major concession to monu-
mentality.6 A site would be protected if, in the first instance, it
was a “monument” and if, in the second instance, it contained
objects—not people.
Monk and Herscher use this concession, as it is upheld
today by UNESCO and in a variety of architectural history 
textbooks, to indict all global history writing. I am not sure why
it is important for them that we rehearse the “technocratic”
ambitions of modernist architects in 1920s Europe and even
gallantly forgive their “inexpertise,” even as we look “beyond
transformations in technocracy” in the case of working histor -
ians, whose actions are ascribed instead to an “emerging epis-
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teme” that resides “not only on the level of practice.” On the
contrary, shouldn’t we ask how habits of history writing
migrate into international governance and back, and expose
such connections?
One specific link is the “comparative method” of architec-
tural history, which ties the exemplarity of monumental archi-
tecture to specific geographic locations and has been one of
historians’ most persistent blinders at least since Banister
Fletcher.7 At UNESCO, comparison became an especially pow-
erful tool after it was conjoined with the fixity of heritage
through the World Heritage Convention. By addressing this
phenomenon briefly, I hope to help dispel the air of historical
inevitability that often surrounds international organizations
and that we scholars risk perpetuating if we do not give histor-
ical flesh to our cultural critiques or negative dialectics.
2.
The World Heritage Convention, as the slightly obsolete-sound-
ing world indicates, predates the discursive ascension of the
“global” in the 1980s and 1990s. It was conceived in a period
when UNESCO approached heritage protection as a standard-
setting project among others, such as revising textbooks, setting
academic research agendas, and encouraging historians to think
comparatively. Comparison was as much a working method as
a feature of the textbooks themselves. The project for a multi-
volume History of Mankind, for instance, attempted to extract
consensus from over a thousand working historians, but instead
it provoked a heated debate over whether world history should
be written by “optimizing diversity” or by “emphasizing inter-
connections.”8 In the absence of agreement, a juxtaposition of
case studies became the default. UNESCO also tried to get at
world history by commissioning theoretical treatises, such as
Claude Lévi-Strauss’s iconic Race and History, which describes
civilization as a repository for “the contributions of cultures.”9
In architecture, heroic campaigns for the salvage of monuments
enforced the physical isolation of objects, a kind of textbook-
writing in space.10
The 1972 World Heritage Convention can be seen as a cul-
mination and radical objectification of this comparative drive
toward a history of “contributions.” The convention was signed
into law on the back of the decade’s environmental activism,
but the method it codifies is much older: an Enlightenment
premise about “human creative genius” married to a fin-de-
siècle relativist aesthetics. Now called “the values approach to
conservation,” that aesthetics is granted the highest formalist
pedigree by reference to Alois Riegl, who, as the literature
never ceases to remind us, pioneered the marriage of law and
art history in 1903.11
But from 1903 to 1972 the comparative mentality had taken
hold not only in a whole host of academic disciplines from art
history to area studies; it also became an instrument of gover-
nance that allowed the evaluation of nations, governments,
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economies, societies. The World Heritage Convention made
architecture available to this newfound calculus. It was not the
architectural content of heritage but the status of the conven-
tion as a species of property law that offered a crucial bridge
between history writing and history making. 
Nothing in the World Heritage Convention mandates the
removal of inhabitants from cultural properties. For example,
no residents had to be expelled from the housing projects
designed in the 1920s by Bruno Taut and Otto Wagner, which
Monk and Herscher mention, when in 2008 the buildings were
inscribed on the World Heritage List as part of the “Berlin
Modernism Housing Estates.”12 They were designated impor-
tant “testimonials” to the Weimar Republic’s “innovative hous-
ing policies” and, unlike at Erbil, this new valuation aligned
the economic interests of some resident-owners. How, then, is
the global historical method implicated in this kind of align-
ment or misalignment?
3.
World Heritage works by asking sites to fulfill one or several of
ten “criteria,” effectively transforming judgments of taste into
legally binding norms. This system was clearly intended to
“optimize diversity” but it has had a homogenizing effect, pro-
duced in concert by its three enforcing authorities:
(1) For nation-states the multiplicity of criteria promotes
thinking of heritage as a kind of portfolio, where oppor-
tunities can be pursued selectively, usually to further
national or nationalist interests.13
(2) The criteria themselves ensure that any difference
of opinion is contained in an art-historical debate, which
is outsourced to a nongovernmental organization (NGO)
such as the International Council on Monuments and
Sites (ICOMOS) or the International Centre for the Study
of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property
(ICCROM). Such NGOs compose the so-called third 
UN.14 In ICOMOS’s judgment about Erbil, we find old-
fashioned architectural hierarchies (the refugees’ archi-
tecture is found “not outstanding” and “encroaching upon
surviving Ottoman edifices”) and a total lack of imagina-
tion about how more recent categories of heritage UNESCO
has proposed, such as intangible or urban, could be called
upon to describe and protect the precarious conditions of
refugee existence.15
(3) At the UNESCO secretariat, the criterion system
absorbs any friction, because all perceived disproportions
can be addressed by recalibrating the canon. By guaran-
teeing that any critique will be statistical, the system
affords a model of cultural distinction that mirrors (and
increasingly tries to compensate for) capitalist accumula-
tion. Since a “Global Strategy for a Representative,
Balanced and Credible World Heritage List” was
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House of Slaves, Island 
of Gorée, Senegal, 1776.
The island was inscribed
on the World Heritage 
List because it “testifies
to an unprecedented
human experience in the
history of humanity” as a
“symbol of the slave trade
with its cortege of suffer-
ing, tears and death.”
Photo: Jean Krausse.
launched in 1994, the criteria have been periodically
revised to account for various imbalances, including an
excess of “particularisms,” a surplus of works authored
by “globally significant persons,” and an overemphasis on
“monumentality.”16
One place where the comparative alliance between history,
law, and architecture has been continually on the verge of crisis
is World Heritage criterion vi, which requires buildings “to be
directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions,
with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of
outstanding universal significance.” This description has
changed several times, but the crucial word has remained
event.17 In contrast to other criteria, this one pertains to politi-
cal history, traditionally conceived as a history of events. With
this criterion UNESCO opens the door to raw “global history”
and does so nervously, judging by the caveat that “this criterion
should preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria.”18
Only eleven out of over a thousand sites have been inscribed
on the World Heritage List for this criterion alone.19 Among
these buildings with no architectural value except one that
indexes global history, we find overwhelming evidence of
human violence: one genocide (Auschwitz); one atomic bomb
(Genbaku Dome); one ethnic war (Mostar Bridge); slavery
(Island of Gorée); and indentured labor (Aapravasi Ghat). These
are the constitutive events of a global history of refugee life.
Moreover, many of these sites are monumental because their
architecture was originally designed for the containment of
forcibly displaced masses.
UNESCO’s discomfort with this brand of monumentality is
barely repressed. Look at the paperwork for the case of the
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Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp, which was inscribed
onto the list “as a unique site” in 1978 and whose inscription
limits further inscriptions “of sites of a similar nature.”20 What
does this caveat mean—that there is room for only one genoci-
dal space in global architectural history? That if the interdic-
tion were lifted, turning concentration camps into monuments
would become the norm? Here we have the seeds for a
dystopian heritage industry, one where humanism and human-
itarianism would be quite compatible.
My point is that the struggle to maintain this division resem-
bles but predates the monetized machinery that Monk and
Herscher describe as splitting citizens from citadels today. The
struggle originates in the irrevocably split way culture exists in
the official international imaginary: culture as owned (con-
tained in buildings as “property”) and culture as lived (sus-
taining continued dwelling and targeted by genocide).
UNESCO uses criterion vi to police the scarcity of World
Heritage, distinguishing it not only from “mere refuge” but
from whatever other cultural products seem dangerously abun-
dant at any given moment. Most recently the World Heritage
Committee has debated whether to remove the word preferably
from the “restrictive language” of criterion vi. This would
mean that association with an event alone would no longer suf-
fice to qualify a site for inscription, a gesture that is perceived
98 Grey Room 61
Maps of the eleven sites
inscribed on the World
Heritage List on the basis
of selection criterion vi
alone, showing sites and
buffer zones. From left 
to right, top to bottom: 
L’Anse aux Meadows
National Historic Site,
Canada (1978); Island of
Gorée, Senegal (1978);
Independence Hall, United
States (1979); Forts and
Castles, Volta, Greater
Accra, Central and
Western Regions, Ghana
(1979); Auschwitz
Birkenau German Nazi
Concentration and
Extermination Camp
(1940–1945), Poland
(1979); Head-Smashed-In
Buffalo Jump, Canada
(1981); Rila Monastery,
Bulgaria (1983); La
Fortaleza and San Juan
National Historic Site in
Puerto Rico, United States
(1982); Hiroshima Peace
Memorial (Genbaku
Dome), Japan (1996); Old
Bridge Area of the Old
City of Mostar, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (2005);
Aapravasi Ghat, Mauritius
(2006).
for various reasons to prevent African states from inscribing
“intangible” heritage into the World Heritage list and, there-
fore, onto a map.21 Some heritage advocates are looking for
ways to leverage intangible categories to earn disenfranchised
groups new cultural rights or new visibility, pushing the defi-
nition of heritage toward the “untranslatability” of language
rather than the irreducibility of events.22 But even if they suc-
ceed, the intangible will be pinned in place. The comparative
method is robust enough to survive a questioning of the original
qualities imputed to architecture in the 1950s—monumentality,
objecthood, tangibility. But there is one criterion that must
remain for its incommensurability: location.
One lesson in intellectual history that can be drawn from
this aspect of enforcement of World Heritage is that the usual
epistemic relationship between international law and global
history has been reversed. As Anson Rabinbach puts it, follow-
ing Mark Osiel, in the case of genocide law “the legal and the
historical often work at cross-purposes: the law aims at inclu-
sivity and generalizability, history at distinctions and differen-
tiations.”23 But in heritage law, criteria intended to foster
inclusiveness are being used to make discriminations, even as
historians are setting their discriminating eyes on an ever
broader, more inclusive field.
4.
Between housing and remembrance is a spectrum of things
buildings do. Any historian interested in repairing this polar-
ization would do well to remember that no textbook has the
power of law. Textbooks are for helping us do our homework.
They are subject to revision and to the unpredictability of
learning.
Of all the ways of writing global history, Monk and Herscher
follow the track of violence. Others are possible, as Frederick
Cooper reminds us, including the history of “thinking like an
empire,” the history of capitalism, the history of religion, and,
we could add, the history of cultivation. All of these can be
written—are being written—as architectural histories. The
challenge is to think of them not merely as “other criteria” for
a history of disjunction or conjunction—not to expand but to
explode our comparative horizons.
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Charles Abrams. 
Man’s Struggle for 
Shelter in an Urbanizing
World (1964).
For the Love of 
(Shared) Politics
M. IJLAL MUZAFFAR
Daniel Bertrand Monk and Andrew Herscher’s piece has brawl-
raising potential, which is not necessarily a bad thing in the
production of scholarship. Such occasions can bring passion
and energy to discussions that otherwise would just stew on
the polite heat of disciplinary exchange. Brawls are good 
so long as at the end of the day we can raise a glass to shared
politics. Looking forward to that moment of lubrication, I would
like, for now, to add some friction to the mix.
As Monk and Herscher point out, the term global history has
the potential to render meaningless any ethics of engagement
across difference that might be built on it. The very idea of
global history can become, the authors stress (and I completely
agree with them), a space for stifling politics. In this space we
can talk of difference, but by putting all those differences in an
infinitely comparative format we make them readily under-
standable through the same lens. This lens becomes the eye of a
new god, the sympathetic globalizer, looking at all places from
a nonplace of all-knowing. This god-view can understand all
politics but have no politics of its own. The global itinerary of
comparable “locals,” both buildings and subjects, resulting
from this view grants one uninterrupted access, a power read-
ily utilized by contemporary discourses of preservation and
humanitarianism. “Because,” Monk and Herscher argue,
while global history endows each historicized building
with a status consistent with an expanded definition of
architecture, and while global humanitarianism endows
each assisted person with a status consistent with an
imperiled population, buildings and people are being
defined in ways more or less suitable for inclusion within
given paradigms of classification or action.
What global history could have done—and should have done,
the authors argue—is to stress the irreducibility of difference
between different contexts rather than reducing them to one
another: “Posed as a triumph of the singular, this integration
erases any words we might possess to describe the actual state
of affairs.”
But here, constraints of publishing, themselves built on the
presumed limits of our attention, stifle the next question that
must be asked and answered in the wake of these assertions.
How are those “actual state of affairs” to be communicated
across differences of concern and politics, if not by utilizing a
language and concept of history that has some universalizing
potential? After all, the very terms refuge, refugee, and shelter
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(and, for that matter, architecture itself) flatten differences of
experience and understanding. If we get rid of these flattening
universals, how do we build political solidarity, empathy, and
shared goals? Would emphasizing “the actual state of affairs”
not create (again) a taxonomy of exaggerated difference in
which all things are so particular that nothing common can be
discerned among them? And would not that compartmentaliz-
ing, that assertion of absolute difference in which nothing is
comparable to anything else, simply form the split side of global
history that made every thing comparable to every other thing?
Though Monk and Herscher might well know the way out of
this dilemma, it still needs to be spelled out, if not in the space
of their text then in the responses to it. This will allow us not
only to challenge the universalizing potential of global history
but to map out strategies to redeploy it. The authors might tell
me, for instance, to go pick up Anna Tsing’s Friction, which
asserts that we cannot, and should not even try to, get rid of the
universal if we are to build shared politics across difference.1
We need to remember only one thing: Universals are not evil;
they are just universals and should be treated as just that. The
danger, the flattening, slips in when we forget that universals
are only concepts that we need in order to talk across differ-
ence. They are not actual reflections of the world they describe.
They are strategic concoctions that we need in order to com-
municate the particularities and politics of each situation to
one another. Universals have that potential just as they have the
potential to foreclose the space of politics.
In Monk and Herscher’s text, the term shelter possesses that
double edge. The term can be deployed strategically as a uni-
versal that allows for particular political connections: a term to
establish a politics of one’s own and to recognize others’ poli-
tics. One could say, “We are using the term shelter because it
already has a certain currency in institutional agendas that we
want to challenge,” or that “We are using the term shelter to
communicate through a familiar concept an alternate under-
standing of occupation and displacement in a particular con-
text.” But to deploy shelter as a strategic universal we have to
declare our politics through it first. Monk and Herscher shy
away from using that double edge to their advantage.
They resist laying out their own politics in using the term
shelter and decline to delve into how others have used the
term. For them, declaring politics seems to be a second step,
one following the first step of identifying the phenomenon in
question itself. The two steps represent different roles. Monk
and Herscher want to take on the role of identifiers, not
activists. Their use of the term shelter deliberately seeks to pro-
cure a neutral space that stands before political action. As they
declare in their text, their goal is only to identify a dialectical
unfolding of the discourses of global history and humanitari-
anism and how that dialectics has displaced the problem of
providing “shelter” with that of providing a credit card. But
what does invoking the term shelter mean in this criticism if
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not an ahistorical, apolitical, basic “human” right? Does that
invocation of the human being and her rights not reserve the
most inconspicuous political space of all, a space from which
one can speak for all history and all politics?
That is the danger in not declaring a political framing—or in
declaring it only as secondary to a more fundamental problem
of shelter. The very use of the term shelter already lays out a
strategy and politics, albeit an invisible politics, the very kind
it seeks to unseat. One cannot use the term shelter and pro-
claim neutrality or, worse, mere criticality. The phenomenon is
the politics; critique is action; and analysis is activism. We can
create two steps, but we have to acknowledge that the first also
leaves a footprint.
Charles Abrams, the prominent U.S. housing activist, chair
of Columbia University’s Urban Planning Program, and New
York City’s rent commissioner, deployed the word shelter in
the 1950s to fight against prevalent racial discrimination in
housing and to institute protection of “rent control” for the eco-
nomically vulnerable.2 The goal of using the term was to invoke
the idea of a “fundamental human right.” Shelter defined the
human as an entity that had fundamental rights prior to or out-
side the law. This strategy worked well, because the demand to
institute this right prior to law was made to an existing legal
and state structure.
In the 1960s Abrams’s fame sent him on a host of interna-
tional development missions where his use of the word shelter
as a fundamental human right produced the opposite effect.3
Abrams was selected for these missions in part because the
United Nations (UN) was looking to scale back the develop-
ment promises it had made earlier. The development schemes
of the 1950s, which turned complex political problems into
technical ones with the help of new Third World governments,
had failed miserably. A new development rhetoric of “basic
human needs” was developed at this time, led by the term shel-
ter. In this case, however, by appealing to needs—if not rights
prior to law—the UN did not seek to make demands on law
(national or international) but to bypass it. To speak for shelter
as a basic need, a human right that preceded legal definitions
and debates, the development agencies carved out only a sphere
of action for themselves and their new modus operandi, the
nongovernmental organization (NGO). This entry into the
national through the backdoor of “shelter” did not seek to
strengthen the nation-state and its laws but to undermine them
in perpetuity, claiming a right to intervene and speak for the
“shelterless” everywhere. What Herscher and Monk find dis-
turbing in Iraq is the latest turn of this bypassing maneuver,
wherein the NGOs are being replaced by an even more imper-
vious instrument, the credit card. But why preserve the very
term, shelter, on which that imperviousness is based? Monk
and Herscher come close to repeating the very phenomenon
they seek to challenge.
We can discern one reason for the centrality of the term shelter
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in Monk and Herscher’s text. With the emphasis on restoring
the idea of shelter to the discourse on shelter, the authors seek
to clear the fog of sameness cast on the refugee and interrupt
the dislocating power of the credit card. The emphasis on 
shelter is meant to relocate the refugee in a specific space, time,
and circumstance so that the story of the “actual state of affairs”
could be told.
But by creating that opening through the term shelter
without giving it a strategic edge, that story cannot be told. The
refugees are asked, again, to appear as refugees in need of 
shelter, a need defined from a nonspace of analytic observation.
Their particular circumstances appear, again, as appendages to
this predefined basic need. The term shelter can never tell the
politics of the story, of the refugee, or of the critic. No one ever
demands only shelter. No one is ever displaced from shelter,
that neutral basic human need. House, housing, shelter are
always already imbricated with religious, political, social, and
economic meaning. The historically loaded word shelter hides
those dimensions through which displacement is imagined
and redressed. The term shelter reserves only a neutral entry
point for the critic.
This is not the only way to use the term shelter. The term can
be deployed strategically as a universal that speaks of differ-
ence rather than silences it. The term can be deployed inten-
tionally to talk across difference, rather than presumed
indifferently to precede difference. The term can form a uni-
versal that brings us together—strategically, politically—to tell
stories of how collectives are formed and why we should not
forget that.
Forgetting was precisely what Abrams’s invocation of the
term shelter sought to do. On a mission to Karachi in 1957,
Abrams identified thousands of refugees occupying the streets
of the city as squatters a decade after they had migrated from
India following the partition of the subcontinent.4 He stressed
the need to understand refugee/squatter “motivation” as a
desire for continued free resources and to operate outside the
law. Rather than eviction, Abrams stressed the need to distrib-
ute “basic” property rights in order to establish “basic” shelter.
For Abrams, politics was greed, a “flaunting” of the law, a devi-
ation from basic human needs. Provision of shelter was a
means of restoring the human in the refugee and preventing her
from turning into a squatter.
The refugees, however, sought to remember: to remember
themselves as refugees. They indeed demanded shelter but not
on the terms Abrams offered it; that is, as a human right. They
demanded shelter as a religious and political entitlement. In
legal terms, the refugees, as Abrams described them, were not
refugees at all. They were citizens of Pakistan who had migrated
from Urdu-speaking parts of India at the time of partition and,
unlike Punjabi-speaking migrants who were settled in the
Pakistani parts of divided Punjab, did not have a correspond-
ing Urdu-speaking province in Pakistan. On the one hand, this
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prolonged their “settlement.” On the other hand, it gave the
question of their settlement the symbolism of settling the future
of the nation above any ethnolinguistic logic. By insisting on
their refugee status, they sought to secure themselves as the
embodiment of the nation and not one of its provinces.5 To do
so, the refugees called themselves muhajirs, a term that invoked
hijrat, the journey taken by the Prophet Muhammad in 622 CE
from Mecca to Medina to protect his followers from persecu-
tion and memorialized by caliph Umar as the beginning of the
Islamic calendar. Upon arrival in Medina, the muhajirs were
hosted by the local insars, who not only provided food and
shelter to the muhajirs but took responsibility for incorporat-
ing them into the insars’ economic life.
The hijrat was thus not only a traversing of geographical
space but a folding of economic and political space—a cen-
tered otherness that resisted political and economic marginal-
ization by claiming a right to hospitality. The muhajirs of
Karachi, from elite politicians to worker organizations, invoked
this history to sway the balance of power well outside the com-
mercial center of Karachi. The careful balance of belonging and
otherness challenged the nativist claims put forth by Sindhi
traditional and landed elite. The muhajirs’ demand for shelter
capitalized on the universality and international currency of
the term shelter but opened it to a host of new dimensions that
resisted passivity and marginalization in both international
and national arenas.
What should happen to the history of this dimension of 
shelter? Should we ignore it, consider it a secondary, local
framing that is to be unpacked by area-studies specialists? Or
should we consider that dimension as the necessary embodi-
ment of the term shelter, an embodiment without which the
term has no meaning, no form, like a soul without a body?
All universals have embodied forms, embodied politics.
Shelter did not just mean to the muhajirs in Karachi something
particular that we can invoke only in its pure universality. Our
invocation is also embodied; it makes sense in particular
spaces, to particular collectives and individuals, for particular
ends. We cannot invoke the term shelter except strategically.
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in a village in India.” From
Charles Abrams, Man’s
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Urbanizing World (1964).
We can either strive toward recognizing that strategy or let our-
selves be strategized, deployed in others’ strategies willy-nilly.
To not recognize the duality of the term shelter—a duality
mobilized by the muhajirs’ invocation of shelter in Karachi and
(surely also) by those removed from Erbil Citadel in Iraqi
Kurdistan—is to foreclose to others a position that we reserve
for ourselves. This is not an argument for context but for a 
different understanding of universals that cannot exist without
context.6
In this vein, I would like to consider the other strand of the
dialectic identified by Monk and Herscher: the movement of
global history. The most potent strategy for creating the possi-
bility of refuge in architectural history and geopolitics is not to
get rid of the universal of global history only to replace it with
a universal discourse of shelter. Rather, echoing the muhajirs,
the possibility of refuge will best be created by strategically
redeploying the idea of global history itself. By this I do not
mean to suggest what Mahmood Mamdani calls doing “history
by analogy,” the very mode of generalized history Monk and
Herscher caution us against.7 Nor do I mean to suggest rehears-
ing the pitfalls of the “area studies” model of history, which
makes the uniqueness of each account so particular, the exper-
tise of the historian so deep, that the only people interested in
listening to you are those in your “area.” Global history not
only can speak to the difference of meaning that surrounds the
titles of refuge and refugee in a particular context; it can also
show how those particularities relate to other particularities.
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The model of global history can be redeployed to develop a 
language of communicating across difference, of building soli-
darity and strategically shared politics, just as well as it can
erase that possibility.
Recall that the idea of global architectural history was not so
smooth when it was put forth in books such as Francis D.K.
Ching, Mark Jarzombek, and Vikramaditya Prakash’s A Global
History of Architecture.8 The idea had a rub and offered 
productive friction to the previous ideas of global history it
countered. Those versions of “global” history were rigorously
Eurocentric. That in itself cannot be considered as a problem.
The pedagogical damage wrought by that bearing stemmed
from the fact that those earlier texts did not declare or even
acknowledge that focus, nor did they discuss the politics of
maintaining it. All good things began in Europe, if not the
United States, simply because they did. The idea of global his-
tory now under our scalpel made new cuts in the smooth and
sealed flesh of the European global history. This feat turned the
acceptable way of looking at the world in architectural peda-
gogy inside out. If after this move its edge became dull, if the
openings it created started to close sooner than imagined, if 
the scars it left in place were covered over with a tan that
appeared more a sign of touristy privilege than its limits, that
is because we have forgotten how and in what concrete cir-
cumstances it made its original mark.
Let us remember that context and identify those contexts
that surround us now when we invoke the term shelter. The
ideas of global history and shelter were developed by political
agents for political ends. If they have done their job, we can
replace them with new universals or redeploy them. But we
have to first identify the concrete spaces in which we are going
to do so and for what ends. And then we have to remember to
raise our glasses, together, to those strategically shared ends.
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Architecture: 
The Global Imaginary in
an Antiglobal World
MARK JARZOMBEK
Daniel Bertrand Monk and Andrew Herscher argue that the 
discipline of global history, because it supposedly champions
an “inclusive and heterogeneous arrays of ‘local’ sites across
the globe,” fails to diminish the sway of the universalist
assumptions of the Enlightenment. Even worse, global history
is a “perversion” of that older project. The newuniversalism—
by the sheer weight of its dialectical majesty—transforms the
great buildings of the past into sites of exclusion.1 Monk and
Herscher use the word global as the telltale signifier of this
tragedy as it moves up and down various academic and economic
registers: from “global history,” to “global history of architec-
ture,” to “global architectural history,” to “global histories of
architecture,” to land ultimately at the doorstep of “the global-
ization of the history of architecture.”
I would like to disentangle the components of this position.
First I will differentiate the disciplinary project that goes by the
heading global history from “a global history of architecture.”
Then I will tackle the question of the geopolitical. In this, I feel
that Monk and Herscher’s argument would be strengthened by
broadening the historical focus rather than targeting the word
global. To demonstrate just how slippery the word is, let me
start by pointing out that though Monk and Herscher argue that
global history has reinforced the focus on “local sites,” the
more normative understanding of the task of global history is
that it tries to challenge the localist point of view. World history
is the more likely target of Monk and Herscher’s critique, espe-
cially since the scholar they cite in reference to the discipline,
William H. McNeill, is generally thought of as a world histo-
rian. Global history took shape only in the last ten years and
then as a general response to world history and the intensifica-
tion in the previous decades of a type of scholarship that was
nation-, region-, or locality-based.
I do not, however, want to belabor the difference, except to
point out that global history (or even world history) is an alto-
gether different animal from “a global history of architecture.”
Unlike world history and global history, no scholarly organiza-
tions, no established peer-reviewed publication venues, and
hardly even any conferences are dedicated to the subject.
Whereas global history is mainly taught in humanities pro-
grams, a global history of architecture is taught in the context
of a survey class in schools of architecture. If it is taught at all!
In the United States, most schools of architecture continue to
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teach from a Eurocentric platform, and only a small percentage
have adopted something like a global history perspective.2 In
Europe, the situation is even worse. The dean in a top school
in Germany told me, “Why teach global history when our stu-
dents do not even know anything about German history?” The
only history class that is required at that institution is one on
German castles. The situation is no better in other places. A
global history of architecture thus has limited institutional
traction or support.
But what exactly is it then? A global history of architecture
is not a return to the encyclopedic worldview. Nor is it a bland
validation of the great monuments of the past or the rejection
of those buildings. Finally, it is not a prioritization of the
“everyday” world, and it does not dismiss the messy reality of
how people live in complex urban, peri-urban, village, and
rural environments. And because architecture’s history goes
back thousands of years, one cannot limit a global history of
architecture to the time period after colonialism. As history, it
is built on evidence as well as on conjecture and critique. A
global history of architecture can be written from a trans -
horizonal perspective, just as it can be written from a stationary
position.3 All of this leaves open a vast intellectual and disci-
plinary territory for discussion and experimentation.
But a global history of architecture—as a still relatively empty
signifier—most certainly should not be confused with an actual
discipline such as global history. Even more important, although
global history and “a global history of architecture” have the
word global in their titles, neither is a global phenomenon. 
In their separate ways they are esoteric academic projects. In
other words, just because the word global is in their titles does
not mean they are globalized or even have that ambition.
What is global, however, is the recently emerging, geopoliti-
cal institutionality of architecture’s history. That is the true
subject matter of Monk and Herscher’s critique, as indicated by
the last phrase in the catenation: “the globalization of the his-
tory of architecture.”4 But why go after semiotic ghosts only to
let the real monster in the room off the hook.
Let me explain.
In the 1970s, the world was still understood as “The World.”
Books were written with titles such as World History in the
Making (1934), World History: The Story of Man through the Ages
(1949), History of World Peoples (1954), and World History: The
Story of Man’s Achievements (1962). In the field of architec-
ture, Sigfried Giedion’s The Eternal Present (1964) represents
the last hurrah of this approach. In good Hegelian fashion it
divides history into three ages, with modernism the culmina-
tion of all architectural and space-making sensibilities. In the
1980s, this worldview began to be challenged, as was the prover-
bial canon. Universalism was the accusatory word. In the field
of architectural studies, a generation of scholars and intellec-
tuals entered into the breach, following one of perhaps four
approaches: semiotics, phenomenology, contextualism, and
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tradition/vernacular studies/preservation. Among these, the
last two are relevant to our discussion for the way in which
they took up the question of the local.5
The contextualists were inspired by Jean-François Lyotard
(The Postmodern Condition, 1979), who argued that we had
reached the end of the writing of history as the story of human-
ity and should thus seek out the plurality of small narratives
that compete with one another. Peter Unger (Philosophical
Relativity, 1984) went so far as to state that different contexts
set different epistemic standards. In the field of cultural his-
tory, Carl Schorske (Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture,
1980) exemplified the contextualist view. In the field of archi-
tectural history, Manfredo Tafuri (Venezia e il rinascimento,
1985) offered a thesis about microhistory. Contextualists tended
to view buildings not as the product of autonomous design
thinking but as cultural phenomena or manifestations of power
and ideology. “Critical Regionalism,” made popular by Kenneth
Frampton, could also be seen as a branch of contextualism; it
spawned a minidiscipline that scoured the world for over-
looked local architects who could be both modern and yet close
to their supposed roots.
This prolocalist attitude took shape, that is, in the era of
postmodern recuperation, long before the discipline of global
history even existed.6 The prolocalist attitude emerged at a time
when no one wanted anything to do with a history that went
back to the much-maligned origins of civilization, a tendency
identified as the toxic residue of Enlightenment pretensions.
But what at the time was an opening in the discursive/political
arena quickly became a narrowing, at least in the discipline of
architecture. Revisionism morphed into discipline creation.
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Though the emergence of localist historiography is usually
associated with postmodernism (speaking generally here for
the sake of argument), one cannot see this in isolation. In fact, it
paralleled the emergence of another new discipline, the “his-
tory of modern architecture.” We might forget that until the
1970s modern architecture did not have a dedicated scholarly
“history.” The only history it had was given either through
Giedion’s high, civilizational perspective or through the lens of
“great men.” Modernist history was also taught not by scholars
but by interested practitioners in the context of the studio. Only
in the late 1970s did modern architecture become a proper his-
torical field. Freed from the obligation of having to deal with
architecture’s problematic “origins,” this discipline began to
look almost exclusively to the history in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. The Museum of Modern Art played its
part with shows such as Louis Kahn: 1901–1974 (1974); The
Architecture of the École des Beaux-Arts (1976); Le Corbusier:
Architectural Drawings (1978); The Architecture of Gunnar
Asplund (1978); and Russia: The Avant Garde (1979). Frampton’s
Modern Architecture: A Critical History appeared in 1980.
The disciplinary restructuring of the late 1970s and 1980s is
important to my argument, since the history of modern archi-
tecture in the United States usually begins with Philip Johnson
and Henry-Russell Hitchcock’s International Style exhibition
(Museum of Modern Art, 1932), then moves to the arrival of
Walter Gropius, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, and others, before
coming to the gradual dissemination of modernism into 
professional practices. In my view, however, modernism’s self-
naturalization as an architectural practice differs from the type
of modernism that began to take form as a complex, multiva-
lent geopolitical institution in the 1980s. In that context, one
has to include the first Ph.D. programs created in schools of
architecture, such as MIT’s in 1975. Soon followed by others,
most have produced graduates with a specialty in twentieth-
century modernism. One can also point to the Venice Architecture
Biennale of 1980, titled The Presence of the Past, for which Rem
Koolhaas penned a polemical piece titled “Our New Sobriety.”7
Architecture’s return to functionalism would be marked, so
Koolhaas hoped, by methodological rigor. The emergence in the
1990s of computation as a research field added to the discipli-
nary thickening around the modernist ethos.
Parallel to this was the rise of a movement that at first blush
seemed to be a reactionary gesture: traditional architecture.
Old buildings have been discussed for centuries, but the idea
of putting the word traditional in front of the word architecture
to indicate a type of disciplinary thinking and production
developed only in the mid-to-late 1970s. Book titles demon-
strate this. Take the example of Japan:
1927: A Brief History of Japanese Architecture
1930: Impressions of Japanese Architecture and the 
Allied Arts
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1935: Japanese Architecture
1936: Fundamentals of Japanese Architecture
1941: A Short History of Japanese Architecture
1962: Guide Book to Japanese Architecture
1972: Traditional Domestic Architecture of Japan
1989: Traditional Japanese Architecture (film)
The rise of traditional architecture and its corollary vernac-
ular architecture can easily be indexed as part of an interroga-
tion of modernity that began in the 1960s. But it was more than
that. From the start, both were geopolitical movements. One
need only point to legislation such as the British Museum Act
(1963), the U.S. Wilderness Act (1964), the National Hispanic
Heritage Week (1968), and the Indian Antiquities and Art
Treasures Act (1972), all leading to the International Convention
on Conservation of Natural and Cultural Heritage (1981).
The creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Convention Concerning
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
(1972) expanded the realm of traditional architecture to the
great monuments of civilization. To be placed on the Heritage
List, nation-states had to propose buildings to UNESCO, with
the result being an increased focus on the nation-state and its
architecture. Not only did we get an officially sanctioned list of
great buildings, cleaned of squatters and restored for posterity;
we also got apps such as Heritage, Heritage of Southeast Asia,
and UNESCO World Heritage that feature thousands of pictures
that reinforce the aesthetic beauty of the various national sites.
The dynamic of the purification of architectural/national
imaginaries played itself out at the Erbil Citadel in Iraqi
Kurdistan, the subject of Monk and Herscher’s analysis. First,
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the ostensibly “difficult social and health conditions within the
Citadel,” as local authorities described it, convinced the
Kurdistan Regional Government to evacuate the citadel, which
they did in 2006. The High Commission for Erbil Citadel
Revitalisation was then established and mandated to document
the citadel’s historic heritage and plan for its so-called revital-
ization.8 The International Council on Monuments and Sites
noted, in the language of modernization, that “the erection of
shelters using looted building materials (252 shacks out of 588
inventoried buildings) have considerably undermined the
integrity of the nominated property.”9 Nonetheless, in 2014, the
site, which by then was “not inhabited,” was accepted for
inclusion on the Heritage List.10
The effort is symptomatic of the newly globalized connec-
tion between modernization and the UNESCO-approved
nationalization of architecture’s history.
All this was magnified by the emergence of national museums.
More national museums have been created in the last twenty
years than in the previous one hundred. These museums need
exhibitions (and curators) that emphasize the priority of 
the nation-state. We increasingly get books with titles along 
the lines of The Art and Architecture of Turkey, The Art and
Architecture of Cambodia, The Architecture of Kenya,
Mongolian Architecture, Chinese Architecture, The Temples of
Korea, and so forth. This type of cultural nationalism has now
become standard operating procedure around the world.11 As a
result, the proverbial canon, critiqued so strongly in the 1970s,
is stronger today than it ever was, for it was in essence out-
sourced to the geopolitics of the nation-state.
The ethics of the alliance between local planning boards,
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historians, researchers, national politics, curatorship, and
international institutions, all convinced of the righteousness of
their efforts, is something that should be vigorously debated,
but my point—since I am here only concerned with the “his-
tory” question and not the humanitarian issue—is that the type
of supporting role that “history” plays in all of this should not
be confused with history as a humanistic discipline. This is a
history operating within the confines of powerful, narcissistic
regimes of epistemological production that did not exist prior
to the 1980s. That is, the intellectual and political project that
began to take shape in the 1970s, often within the context of
identity politics and postcolonial sensibilities, came to be mag-
nified and formalized by a political-industrial matrix that was
grounded in internationally sanctioned, nation-affirming, and
nation-building ideologies.
The impact on architectural teaching was profound. In
India, for example, in 1983, the Council for Architecture 
mandated in new standards for architectural education that
students should “study the various styles of Architecture and
methods of construction through the ages in the world with
emphasis on Indian Architecture.”12 Even as late as 2013, the
recommended curriculum in India listed ten books dedicated
to architectural history. Five had the word India in the title.
The rest were on Greece, Rome, the Romanesque, the Gothic, and
the contemporary, including readings from that nineteenth-
century classic, History of Architecture, by Banister Fletcher.13
Clearly the old Eurocentric view is now “balanced” by a 
nation-centric view, one that is repeated in countries world-
wide. In Japan, one of the leading design schools, announces
this on its website:
The first year training teaches the fundamentals of spatial
design. Beginning with human dimensions as a base, the
spatial scale gradually expands as the subject of design is
developed, moving through lighting, fashion, furniture
and interior design. . . . Students then learn the elements
of architecture through classes on planning and general
construction, while a class on Japanese architectural his-
tory cultivates foundational learning as an architect.14
On the surface of things, the preservation industry, nation-based
historiography, and traditional architecture (again, with their
disciplinary foundations in a world of journals, publications,
researchers, conferences, institutions, and apps) were seen as
disciplines in opposition to modernism, when in reality tradi-
tion and modernism are two sides of the same phenomenon,
which to some degree explains the profound lack of any kind
of organized critique.
Today scholars are well aware of the false duality between
tradition and modernism, but that is not how the disciplinary
field of architecture and art history operates, especially in 
contexts outside of the United States.15 Take, for example, the
Leeum, Samsung Museum of Art in Seoul, Korea, with its
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Museum for Traditional Korean Art designed by Mario Botta,
and—in a separate building—its Museum of Modern Art
designed by Jean Nouvel. Botta was seen by the Korean patrons
as a good candidate for the job of designing the Museum for
Traditional Korean Art. As a good Eurocentric, the argument
went, he would be sympathetic to Korea’s nation-centrism.16
Therein lies the problem I have been talking about: the institu-
tionalization, nationalization, bureaucratization, and curatori-
alization of the division of modern and tradition. This is a
global problem that legitimates Eurocentrism as just one mani-
festation of many types of centrism.
Historians of modern architecture have more or less turned a
blind eye to this entire problem. The result is an unholy
alliance in which old buildings in schools of architecture around
the world are taught by preservationists, often with localist
leanings, whereas the twentieth-century buildings are increas-
ingly taught by historians, producing an odd reversal of expecta-
tions. Architectural history—the discipline—has almost become
a code word for the history of modernism, whereas the “histori-
cal”—now sadly often called “the premodern”—is allied with
epistemologies that champion the proverbial “pride of place.”17
In the United States, the narrative restrictions that have been
placed on the architectural object were exacerbated when, in
the last two decades, in order to make room for the two new
disciplines in the tenure system, representatives of fields such
as anthropology and sociology (not to mention the old
Eurocentric discipline of Renaissance architecture), which
were often seen as part of the standard architectural curricu-
lum until the 1970s, simply vanished. Today in the United
States, one finds fewer and fewer architectural history scholars
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who work on material that is older than the nineteenth century.
This silent purge has gone uncritiqued and is having a pro-
found and largely negative impact on the field.18 The type of
purification and magnification of architecture’s history that one
finds in the context of preservation parallels the purification, in
schools of architecture, of architecture’s broader history.
What, then, as Monk and Herscher write, “endows each his-
toricized building with a status consistent with an expanded
definition of architecture”? I do not think the answer is “the
globalization of architecture’s history” as associated in their
minds with something called “a global history of architecture”
but rather the expanded field of architecture itself—and, more
precisely, its late-twentieth-century, supersized, modernist 
ideology. As a global matrix, this expanded field uses the 
discipline we call “history” as just another part of the self-
naturalization of the modern while in the same breath trying to
naturalize and universalize its nation-based protocols. The
problem, therefore, is not history but the disciplining of history.
The problem is not globalization but its more precise variant,
nationalization, and the globally sanctioned attempt to natu-
ralize its various epistemological productions. In the last three
decades this has become a historical phenomenon in its own
right, one that leads us, paradoxically, into the belly of the
beast: the modern geopolitical.
To summarize: The 1970s saw the beginning of a transfor-
mation across the board in academe. This was an exciting
moment of epistemological recuperation and institution build-
ing. But beginning in the 1980s, the emergent disciplinary 
realities of modernism and preservation, riding on the coattails
of globalization, expanded their horizons beyond expectations
and became the new normal. The institutions of today that
define and protect these disciplines are, however, marked by an
increasing intransigence and lack of flexibility. This means
that, as valuable as the disciplinary innovation was back in the
1970s and 1980s, one has to make the transition into a different
mind-set in order to finish the fight.
Which brings me back to that slippery word global.
In the face of intractable philosophical critiques, we can
remove global from our vocabulary and see it as just an abbre-
viation of the word globalization. But that would be to ignore
an unexpected opportunity to rethink the production of knowl-
edge.19 With that in mind, a global history of architecture—not
as that which is merely there to re-produce the universal but as
that which is actively suppressed by it—bears witness to the
inscribed limitations of architecture’s status quo. As such its
first disciplinary task is to expose the epistemological regimes—
the globally enforced antiglobals—that define a whole spectrum
of museological/administrative/pedagogical/curatorial practices
that lie at the core of the architectural world.20 A global history of
architecture is not a discipline; it is an accusation.
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Notes
1. I assume that Monk and Herscher’s critique of universalism is the clas-
sic one that tries to expose metaphysical operations that destroy difference,
whether by sublating difference into identity or excising it from identity. I
also assume that the authors are claiming that universalism has become con-
cretized through the word global and, in that sense, that the word itself is the
carrier of a dialectic vitality that operates for the sole purpose of completing
its mission of “presence.” The issue is that in detaching global from global-
ization, and then relinking the phrases, Monk and Herscher play on sematic
slippages that keep them from digging deeper into what exactly is being
“globalized” in the ultimate condition of the “globalization of architecture’s
history.” In this response, I am more interested in showing how relations of
power construct realms of objectivity. In this way we avoid the problem of a
“false positive” (so to speak) of guilt by semantic association.
2. In its 2014 Conditions for Accreditation, the National Architectural
Accrediting Board (NAAB) requires “History and Global Culture: Understanding
of the parallel and divergent histories of architecture and the cultural norms
of a variety of indigenous, vernacular, local, and regional settings in terms of
their political, economic, social, ecological, and technological factors.”
NAAB, 2014 Conditions for Accreditation (Washington, DC: NAAB, 2014),
16, http://www.naab.org/accreditation/2014_Conditions. Though this is the
beginning of the conversation, NAAB’s understanding of what “global” rep-
resents derives from ideas generated in the 1970s. The assumption, for exam-
ple, that global history “starts” with indigenous cultures and moves its way
up the political ladder is not what I mean by global.
3. I use the word transhorizon to include more than just issues of trade
and commerce and the spread of ideas, technologies, disease, and so on. A
history that moves across the horizon can be produced in many ways, includ-
ing by comparative analysis or the narrative of imaginary travels. A global
history does not even require that history cross the horizon in any real sense
of the word. A single building can be discussed from a global-history point
of view.
4. I am not sure how to read their use of the word globalization. They 
cannot possibly mean that architectural history plays a direct role in the eco-
nomics of neoliberal capitalism. They probably mean that architectural 
history is somehow being global-ized without, however, explaining how it is
thus disseminated throughout the world. “Globalization” is a semiotic indi-
cator of the spirit of universalism present in a global architectural history’s
discourse. In chasing after the word global, Monk and Herscher thus wind up
facing the problem of how the universal manifests itself in the concrete. For
Monk and Herscher it does so in various texts produced by intellectuals in
the field. These texts, they then imply, conceal their true class-specific mean-
ing in the interest of a dominant ideology whose workings can best be
exposed to view through an immanent critique of unwitting self-revelations.
In this critique, perhaps deriving from Antonio Gramsci, the intellectuals
they discuss are presented as a type of alienated class participating blindly—
if not stubbornly—in a process that both enforces and propagates the hege-
mony of the universal. The problem, as I see it, is not the intellectuals,
legitimate targets though they may be (including me), but a broader system
of empowerment. That is, the problem is bigger than the authors imply.
5. The semiotic approach was pursued by Charles Jencks and others, but
since it did not develop an extensive institutional footprint I leave it for a 
different discussion. Some strands also moved in the direction of poststruc-
turalism and postcolonialism, but these were generally small in scale and
existed at the upper end of the academic ladder. As to the phenomenologists,
they championed an existentialist-type of “being-in-the-world.” Readings
centered on Martin Heidegger, Gaston Bachelard, and later, though in a more
limited way, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.
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6. This has been the subject of a vast amount of speculation. Edward Soja’s
identification of the “spatial turn” in the social sciences is one example.
Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in
Critical Social Theory (London: Verso Books, 1989).
7. Rem Koolhaas and Elia Zenghelis, “La nostra nuova sobrietà,” in La 
presenza del passato: Prima mostra internazionale di architettura, exh. cat.
(Venice: Edizioni La Biennale di Venezia, 1980), 214–216.
8. ICOMOS [International Council on Monuments and Sites], “Erbil
Citadel (Republic of Iraq) No 1437,” in 2014 Evaluations of Nominations of
Cultural and Mixed Properties to the World Heritage List, ICOMOS Report for
the World Heritage Committee, 38th Ordinary Session, Doha, June 2014,
WHC-14/38.COM/INF.8B1 (Paris: ICOMOS, 2014), 80, http://whc.unesco.org/
archive/2014/whc14-38com-inf8B1-en.pdf. See also, UNESCO World Heritage
Committee, Decisions Adopted by the World Heritage Committee at Its 38th
Session (Doha, 2014), WHC-14/38.COM/16 (Paris: UNESCO, 2014), 189–91,
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2014/whc14-38com-16en.pdf.
9. ICOMOS, 82.
10. ICOMOS, 79; and UNESCO World Heritage Committee, 189–91.
11. See also, Mark Jarzombek, “The Metaphysics of Permanence—Curating
Critical Impossibilities,” Log, no. 21 (2010): 125–35.
12. “Minimum Standards of Architectural Education Regulations, 1983,”
Council of Architecture, http://www.coa.gov.in/acts/regulation1983.htm.
13. All India Council for Technical Education, Model Curriculum for
Undergraduate Programme in Bachelor of Architecture 2013 (New Delhi: 
All India Council for Technical Education, 2013), http://www.aicte-india.org/
downloads/B.%20Arch_syllabus_2013.pdf.
14. “Architecture,” Kyoto Seika University website, http://www.kyoto-
seika.ac.jp/eng/edu/design/architecture/.
15. See, for example, Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The
Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1969).
16. This is condensed from a series of discussions I had at the opening of
the museum in 2004, when I and others presented papers. Botta gave a talk
focusing on his admiration of the European cathedral, admitting that this
sensibility, rather than any familiarity with Korean culture, was what got him
the commission.
17. The UNESCO-ification of architecture and the complex role UNESCO
plays in geopolitical epistemologies has come increasingly under interroga-
tion by several scholars in the field. Here, my point focuses only on the sanc-
tioned divisions of academic labor, which produce a false global.
18. The diminution of interest in pre-nineteenth-century material also
applies to the field of history more generally. Jerry Bentley, editor of the
Journal of World History, notes that of the 195 articles published in that 
journal from 1990 to 2006 only seventeen deal with periods before 1500. See
Global Practice in World History: Advances Worldwide, ed. Patrick Manning
(Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2008), 20, 133–34.
19. My view of the use of the word global is more elastic than that of Monk
and Herscher. Instead of seeing global as filled only with toxicity, I argue that
the word can be redeemed and that its status of signifier can be reopened,
indeed must be reopened, precisely because we have to face the challenge of
what global means or could mean in the future—in a world that is indeed
global, if more in imagination than reality.
20. The problem of teaching a class called Global History of Architecture—
as humble a problem as that might at first seem—forces the academic world
to confront the built-in mechanisms that passively oppose the teaching of a
global history of architecture, as well as to actively resist a more expansive
notion of what it might mean to be ”global.” The solution is not to reshape
Ph.D. education and tenure expectations but to understand first the struc-
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tural disconnect between how a Ph.D. topic is produced and how a global
history of architecture is produced. The former falls into the category of dis-
ciplines that ground themselves in books and peer-reviewed publications.
The latter has a target audience that consists namely of architecture students,
who, in principle at least, are expected to take survey classes that introduce
the broader parameters of the history of the field. Such classes, usually taught
by the professors at the bottom of the academic food chain, are often seen as
far too trivial for advanced scholars. The problem is all the more acute since
architecture education today promotes the worldview of what is now cumu-
latively called the “creative class.” In a so-called globalized world, a world
without obvious unifying narratives, architectural education emphasizes the
universality of creativity, and this usually points the efforts of the students
in the direction of modernist antihistoricism, with its built-in resistance to
deep histories and the critiques necessary to come to grips with cultural
questions in the twenty-first century. Students travel the world with studio
professors and engage in issues far from their homeland. The assumption is
that if one removes -ization from the word globalization, one magically gets
to “global,” and then, if one throws a historian into the mix, one gets to
“global history.” But the proximity of a global studio to global history is fool’s
gold. Global history is not created through the accidents and arbitrariness of
global travel and globally scaled education.
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Seize the Definition
SWATI CHATTOPADHYAY
Definitions belong to the definers, not the defined.1
Daniel Bertrand Monk and Andrew Herscher trace two parallel
phenomena: (1) the institution of world heritage conservation,
which facilitates the consumption of historic sites as global his-
tory; and (2) the dislocation of refugees from their home into a
new sphere of “voucher humanitarianism.” They argue that
these two processes are conjoined by the same epistemic vio-
lence that hinges on an indistinction between the refugee camp
and the world itself, the latter preoccupied by the interests of a
cosmopolitan elite. The coevalness of the rise of global history
and voucher humanitarianism, they claim, posits a new uni-
versalism in which the connection between refuge and refugee
has been severed.
Monk and Herscher’s argument suggests two corollaries: 
(1) that any place is susceptible to becoming a refugee camp—
dislocated from history and shelter itself—residing outside the
world-that-matters; and (2) that this pattern of epistemic vio-
lence is not only limited to UNESCO-style fashioning of global
history but carries over, often in ways unexamined, to other
arenas of global history practice, such as global architectural
history. The first follows from the premise of bare life and cer-
tain populations’ susceptibility to subalternization. The second
resides in a continuum between world heritage–making and
the writing of architectural history surveys as a history of
world monuments.
I write in the spirit of intellectual comradeship, as I share
Monk and Herscher’s critical position on the intertwining 
of subalternity and tacit cosmopolitanism that undergirds 
heritage conservation, voucher humanitarianism, and certain
forms of global history writing. But perhaps in their criticism
of global architectural history they concede too much to the
dominant forces that attempt to set the terms of discourse. This
concession springs from the assumption of the unity of archi-
tecture as a concept.
The play between the universal and the global that enables
certain claims to appear self-evident is worthy of our attention.
Monk and Herscher point out that the ecumenism of place
championed by global history surveys has only made the local
exemplars that were earlier left out of historical surveys a mere
variation on the universal. Neither the general principle nor the
analytic is challenged in such evocations of the local. The
canon is made more capacious and the raft of universalism
enables a safe ride over the raging waters of globality in the pas-
sage from the West to the non-West (the temporal and spatial
starting point of the journey is suggestive). I am making a dis-
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tinction here between the messy process and practices that
constitute “globality,” the experience of engaging with geopoli-
tics and the global movements of populations, commodities, and
ideas, and “globalism,” typically the ideological safe-ground of
a cosmopolitan elite. And globality is not universality.
If global history today instantiates the particular as an effect
of the universal, then that is far from new.2 Indeed it is exactly
what the imperial global history of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries enacted: the mode has changed in keeping
with the changing modes of capitalism, not the content of the
claim to speak for and stand in for other peoples. The logic of
coloniality that pervades such imperialism connects the old
and new universalisms.3
A scrupulous attention to the difference between the uni-
versal and the global is in order. The universal suggests com-
monality and sameness: its figure is the abstract human; it does
not allow specificity of context. The global inclines toward 
plurality through interconnections or networks and thereby
harbors the possibility of challenging the presumption of 
the universal.
In the nineteenth century and through the mid-twentieth
century global networks were constructed and dominated by
European imperialism. A seamless integration of universalism
and globalism was deemed necessary for the project of
European imperialism to take hold.4 Anticolonial nationalists
during the decades of decolonization (and long before the
period of formal decolonization from the 1940s through the
1970s) worked to claim these networks for their own purposes
while still appealing to a universalism—primarily sameness—
in their treatment as political subjects.5 An example of such
network formation was the 1955 Bandung conference. Globally,
the discourse and practice of post-WWII housing was lodged in
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Delegates of Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Yemen walk
to Merdeka Building in
Bandung, Indonesia, to
participate in the Asian-
African Conference, April
20, 1955. National
Archives of the Republic
of Indonesia.
the often incompatible and conflicting goals of the new impe-
rialism of the post-WWII era (channeled through organizations
such as the World Bank and the World Health Organization)
and the disparate goals of the postcolonial leaders as they
strove to solve the problem of shelter in their own fledging
nation-states. The propositions of shelter that came out of this
entanglement were diverse and may not be subsumed within
the goals and practices of the Congrès Internationaux
d’Architecture Moderne’s (CIAM) architect-planners. So let us
not instantiate the housing question by citing CIAM.
Similarly, the embrace of global architectural history we 
see today was not simply a liberal contamination from cognate 
disciplines but was the work of at least two generations of
architectural historians who, working on the peripheries of
Euro-American history, forced a recognition of the importance
of the “not-West” amid those raised in and preoccupied by the
dominant discourse.6 So the slide of newer architectural 
history surveys into a new universalism needs to be seen in a
different light than that offered by Monk and Herscher. If the
gaze of these historians turned beyond the West, and they made
the non-West appear on the scene of history as a figure of the
“local,” this was accomplished to keep intact the concept of
architecture. The assumption of the unity of architecture as a
concept allows the screen of universalism to operate upon the
built environment around the globe to see Architecture (i.e.,
architecture with a capital “A” marked by canonical signifi-
cance). The corrective is not simply to enable refugees to
inhabit or return to the citadel. To prevent universalism from
taking hold, we need to disaggregate the term architecture and
suspend its unity: reimagine the citadel.
Let us seize the definition of the global and review its net-
works if we wish to change the practice of history—architec-
tural or otherwise.
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In Particular
DANIEL BERTRAND MONK AND ANDREW HERSCHER
Our essay concerns the historical atrophy of consciousness of
a necessary and logical connection between refuge and refugee
and, with that atrophy, of a widening “protection gap.” Ours is
a revisionist history of a normative revisionist tendency, and no
one should mistake it for a call for the return to a past state of
affairs. By design, no affirmative program can be derived from
our analysis. That said, we do not think the essay’s systematic
negation qualifies as mere critique. Our inquiry into the disso-
ciations of refuge and refugee is a via negativa into a contem-
porary condition that can neither tolerate nor recognize the
demand of the displaced on thought, except as corroborating
instances of the dissociation we document.
What is to some extent common to the thoughtful and
provocative responses to our argument is a staging of vivid,
culturally specific, ethnographically rich, historically complex,
and/or politically propitious phenomena that are putatively
ignored by, or subsumed into our narrative’s presumably
abstract, universalizing, schematizing, or paradigmatic terms.
This staging adds important details to the history whose 
outlines we present. At the same time, we cannot escape the
impression that this is precisely how the dissociation we docu-
ment perpetuates itself. Qualified in some of the responses as
“local” or “specific,” these factemes are resources that can be
processed into just the forms of particularity that we see as
constitutive of the prevailing tendency we call the “new uni-
versalism.” Indeed, that the responses to our essay locate these
factemes sometimes in the actions of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and some-
times in the voices of individual refugees speaks to the func-
tion of particularity-as-such, rather than to any specific content
of this particularity. Such responses ratify the returns that 
particularity brings to disaggregated disciplines and therefore
normalizes their disaggregation.
Further, some of our interlocutors suggest a metonymy in
which the universalizing terms we seek to historicize become
evidence of our own disavowed or unacknowledged resort to
universals. For example, one response critiques our analysis as
a reification of the very terms that solicit and inform it, partic-
ularly shelter. For us, this is indeed a key term, whose putative
universalism has emerged historically. This is why we point to
shelter as an artifact of historically specific intersections of
architecture and humanitarianism and its subsequent itinerary
that runs from social reformist to socialist. We are cognizant of
the term’s very different status in the writings of Friedrich
Engels and in the efforts of Charles Abrams and suggest that
“shelter” cannot be reduced to a product of the distinction
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between “government of the social” and the humanitarian gov-
ernance cited by another response. We stage shelter, therefore,
as a trace: a repressed, denigrated, and at times annihilated
component of conceptual structures within which terms such
as architecture and refugee appear and corresponding relations
to alterity are made possible in the process of advancing iden-
titarian thought.
In this sense, “shelter” becomes that from which the “archi-
tecture” produced by architectural history distinguishes itself.
Enacted in the chain of substitutions from shelter to building to
architecture in Le Corbusier’s conclusion to Vers une architec-
ture, this distinction has subsequently been reprised in a 
number of versions of architectural history, so that the history
of this distinction deconstructs the self-avowed unity of “archi-
tecture.”1 “Shelter” is also, we argue, what humanitarianism
has come to distinguish the “refugee” from. Those (un)named
as “refugees” are the trace that several of our respondents point
to, and this trace, too, solicits historicization. That is, as
presently constituted the refugee demands an account of the
way that normative assessments of its place and status them-
selves assume and reproduce the fully political disappearance
of the refuge as a relevant and paired concept.
As for global architectural history, we find our critique of its
disciplinary self-ordering further substantiated in some of the
responses. Global here signifies a concatenation of “local” sites
rather than sites that are themselves concatenated by globaliz-
ing systems—which is why, contra other versions of global his-
tory, global histories of architecture typically begin with a
precomprehended object of study (“architecture”) rather than
with “globalization.” That is their prerogative, but what matters
most in the present context is the way that a field of knowledge
disavows its externality from its own object and, in the process,
participates in a geopolitical ordering of the present quite dis-
tinct from the one against which it self-consciously distin-
guishes itself. Both buildings and displaced humanity “enjoy”
careers that cannot be reconciled with the ones assigned them
in present thought. To the contrary, in a historical moment
marked by the displacement of more than 55 million people
(around 38 million internally displaced people and 17 million
refugees worldwide), the fate of the displaced must be mea-
sured immanently against what Theodor Adorno once called
the conceptual “nature preserves” into which knowledge has
cast them.2
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